Group signatures allow members to sign on behalf of a group while maintaining signer's identity anonymous.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental cryptographic primitive which allows group users to anonymously sign documents on behalf of the whole group is called group signature, but in case of abuse, an administrator can revoke the anonymity of the signer. Group signature was introduced in (Chaum and van Heyst, 1991) . Since then, many works have been proposed in this area [(Ateniese et al., 2000) , (Boneh et al., 2004) , (Camenisch et al., 2012) , (Gordon et al., 2010) ]. For anonymity and traceability properties of these schemes, group signatures are highly useful in various real-life scenarios such as controlled anonymous printing services, digital right management systems, e-bidding and e-voting schemes. The majority of group signature schemes are based on number theory assumptions [ (Libert et al., 2012) , (Camenisch and Stadler, 1997) , (Boyen and Waters, 2006) , (Boneh et al., 2004) ], but number-theoretic based cryptography will not resist to the quantum computing. Recently, the research for post-quantum group signatures is quite active as shows these publications (Laguillaumie et al., 2013) , (Langlois et al., 2014) , , (Alamélou et al., ) , (Gordon et al., 2010) . The majority of these works are based on lattice assumptions, while in codebased cryptography we denote two group signature schemes: the first one is based on BSZ model (Bellare et al., 2005) and it is presented in (Alamélou et al., ) . The second one is based on BMW model (Bellare et al., 2003) and is presented in (Ezerman et al., 2015) , this scheme satisfies the CPA-anonymity and traceability requirements in the random oracle model. But the size of the signature and the public key makes this scheme impractical.
In this article, we propose a new provably secure group signature scheme based on code assumptions presented in (Ezerman et al., 2015) . In this construction we replace the original McEliece cryptosystem used to encrypt the signer identity by the Quasi-cyclic Moderate Density Parity-Check (QC-MDPC) version of McEliece. The advantage of QC-MDPC codes is that for the same security level, the QC-MDPC version of McEliece has very short public key size than the original version. For example, for 80 bits security level, the QC-MDPC public key is 4801 bits unlike the original McEliece public key which is around 500000 bits. The second improvement consist in using a random double circulant matrix for the Underlying Zero Knowledge Argument System as proposed in (Gaborit and Girault, 2007) , we suggest to replace a random matrix used by Stern (Stern, 1996) in the Zero-Knowledge identification scheme by a random double circulant matrix. This construction allows to have a very short public key, only 349 bits to obtain 2 83 of security level in the Zero-Knowledge identification scheme. These two improvements reduce dramatically the public key size of the group signature scheme without impacting the security level. For instance, in the case of 16 users we achieve a public key size of 1.34 KB, while the size is around 625 KB in the original scheme (Ezerman et al., 2015) . Moreover, the structure of these matrices makes the implementation easier and efficient, since the product of a circulant matrix and a vector can be obtained by multiplying only the first row of the circulant matrix with shifts of the vector.
The organization of this paper is as follows: in Section 2 we recall the main tools of code-based cryptography, then we explain in Section 3 how to decrease the size of the public key by using the QC-MDPC version of McEliece cryptosystem and double circulant matrices. In Section 4, we consider the security of this new construction, while Section 5 compares the performances of the new provably secure group signature with the previous one. Section 6 is devoted for conclusion.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first provide the notations that will be used all along this work, secondly we give background in code-based cryptography and finally we define the group signature.
Notations
Let λ denotes the security parameter and negl(λ) denotes a negligible function in λ. We denote by a $ ← S if a is chosen uniformly at random from the finite set S. The symmetric group of all permutations of k elements is denoted by S k . We use bold capital letters, (e.g., A), to denote matrices, and bold lowercase letters, (e.g., x), to denote row vectors. We use x to denote the transpose of x and wt(x) to denote the Hamming weight of x. We denote by B(m, ω) the set of all vectors x ∈ F m 2 (x is a vector of m bits) of hamming weight ω: wt(x) = ω. Throughout the paper, we define a function I2B which takes a nonnegative integer a as an input, and outputs the binary representation (a 0 , · · · , a −1 ) ∈ {0, 1} of a such that a = ∑ −1 i=0 a i 2 −1−i , and a function B2I which takes as an input the binary representation (a 0 , · · · , a −1 ) ∈ {0, 1} of a, and outputs a. All logarithms are of base 2. By 1 λ we denote the string of N ones. We denote by ⊕ the bitwise XOR operator.
Code-based Cryptography Background
Now we give some necessary notions in code-based cryptography for the well understanding of our work. Double Circulant Matrices. We say that H is a double circulant matrix if H = [I p |A] where I p is the identity matrix of size p and A is a circulant matrix of length p, which means a p × p matrix generated from its first row a = (a 0 , ..., a p−1 )
(n, q, w)-QC-MDPC Code Construction. We are specially interested in (n, q, w)-QC-MDPC codes where n = n 0 q. This means that the paritycheck matrix has the form
where H i is a q × q circulant block. We define the first row of H picking a random vector of length n = n 0 q and weight w. The other q − 1 rows are obtained from the q − 1 quasi-cyclic shifts of this first row. Each block H i will have a row weight w i , such that w = ∑ n 0 −1 i=0 w i . A generator matrix G in row reduced echelon form can be easily derived from the H i 's blocks. Assuming the rightmost block H n 0 −1 is non-singular (which particularly implies w n 0 −1 is odd, otherwise the rows of H n 0 −1 would sum up to 0), we construct a generator-matrix as follows.
Remark 2.1. Since we work in F 2 , we notice that generating a double circulant matrix H = [I p |A] of length p require only p bits corresponding to the first row a = (a 0 , a 1 , ..., a p−1 ) of A (1). On the other hand, the generator matrix of a (n, q, w) QC-MDPC code can be deduced only from a n − q bits corresponding to the first row of each block H i .
Syndrome Decoding Problem.
The Syndrome Decoding problem is a problem based on coding theory proved to be NP-complete in (Berlekamp et al., 1978) .
Definition 2.1. The SD(m, k, ω) problem is formulated as follows: given a uniformly random matrix H ∈ F k×m 2 and a uniformly random syndrome y ∈ F k 2 , find a vector s ∈ B(m, ω) such that H · s = y . When m, k and ω are chosen based on λ, we say that the SD(m, k, ω) problem is hard, if the success probability of any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm in solving the problem is at most negl(λ).
Syndrome Decoding Problem for Random Double Circulant Codes. We define a new problem, which adapts the syndrome decoding problem to the case of random double circulant codes: Definition 2.2. The SD(2p, p, ω) problem is formulated as follows: Instance: given a random double circulant matrix H ∈ F p×2p 2 and a vector y ∈ F p 2 . Question:find a vector s ∈ B(2p, ω) such that H·s = y .
It is not known whether this problem is NPcomplete, but the problem is probably as hard as syndrome decoding problem, and on practical point of view (see (Gaborit and Girault, 2007) ) the practical security is almost the same for the best known attack that syndrome decoding for random matrices.
The Randomized QC-MDPC McEliece Encryption Scheme. We derive from the QC-MDPC McEliece encryption scheme (Misoczki et al., 2013) a randomized variant as it is suggested in (Nojima et al., 2008) for the original version (McEliece, 1978) with Goppa codes, where a uniformly random vector is concatenated to the plaintext. We describe the scheme as follows:
• Let S(1 λ ) be the setup algorithm, it selects parameters n, q, t and w which are chosen based on λ for a binary t-error-correcting (n, q, w)-QC-MDPC code. Choose integers q 1 , q 2 such that n − q = q 1 + q 2 . Set the plaintext space as F q 2 2 .
• Let K (n, q, w,t) be the algorithm that generate the keys, it performs in two steps:
1. Generate a parity-check matrix H ∈ F q×n 2 of a t-error-correcting (n, q, w)-QC-MDPC code. 2. Generate its corresponding generator matrix G ∈ F (n−q)×n 2 in row reduced echelon form. Output encrypting key pk ME = G and decrypting key sk ME = H.
• Let E(pk ME , m) be the encryption algorithm, it encrypts a message m ∈ F q 2 2 , sample u
2 and e $ ← B(n,t), then output the ciphertext c = (u m) · G ⊕ e ∈ F n 2 .
• Let D(sk ME , c) be the decryption algorithm and let R H be a t-error correcting Low-Density Parity Check (LDPC) decoding algorithm equipped with the knowledge of H. To decrypt c ∈ F n 2 :
1. compute y = R H (c)
2. get the plaintext m as follow: extract (u m) from the first (n − q) positions of y.
Definition 2.3 (Codeword Finding Problem). The CwF(n, k, w) problem is as follows: given a matrix H ∈ F k×n 2 and an integer w, the problem is to find a codeword of weight at most w in the code of generator-matrix H.
Definition 2.4 (The Decisional McEliece Problem).
The DMcE(n, k,t) problem is as follows: given a matrix G ∈ F k×n 2 , distinguish whether G is a uniformly random matrix over F k×n 2 or it is generated by algorithm K (n, q, w,t) described above.
When n, q, t are chosen based on λ and k = n − q, we say that the DMcE(n, k,t) problem is hard, if the success probability of any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) distinguisher is at most 1 2 + negl(λ). Definition 2.5 (The Decisional Learning Parity with (Fixed-weight) Noise Problem). The DLPN(k, n, B(n,t)) problem is as follows: given a pair
← B(n,t) and outputting (A, u · A ⊕ e). When n, k, t are chosen based on λ, we say that the DLPN(k, n, B(n,t)) problem is hard, if the success probability of any PPT distinguisher is at most Niederreiter is not easier than solving the syndrome decoding problem for a random code.
• Breaking the QC-MDPC variant of McEliece or Niederreiter is not easier than solving the syndrome decoding problem for a random quasicyclic linear code.
Proof. The proof is given in (Misoczki et al., 2013) .
Remark 2.2. The Proposition 2.1 shows that DMcE and DLPN problems from (n, q, w)-QC-MDPC code are both very hard as the random case of these problems.
In the standard model assuming the hardness of the DMcE(n, k,t) problem and the DLPN(q 1 , n, B(n,t)) problem described in [ (Döttling, 2014) , (Nojima et al., 2008) ] and assuming the Remark 2.2, the scheme described above is CPA-Secure.
The Underlying Zero-knowledge Argument System. We recall the Underlying Zero Knowledge Argument System used by Ezerman and al in (Ezerman et al., 2015) which is based on Stern Zero Knowledge Protocol (Stern, 1996) using random double circulant matrix instead of random matrix .
Let n, q,t, w, p, ω, be positive integers, and N = 2 . In this protocol, the public input consists of matrices G ∈ F (n−q)×n 2 , H ∈ F p×2p 2 ; N syndromes y 0 , · · · , y N−1 ∈ F p 2 ; and a vector c ∈ F n 2 . It allows prover P to simultaneously convince verifier V in Zero Knowledge that P possesses a vector s ∈ B(2p, ω) corresponding to certain syndrome y j ∈ {y 0 , · · · , y N−1 } with hidden index j, and that c is a correct encryption of I2B( j) via the randomized QC-MDPC McEliece encryption. Specifically, the secret
× F n 2 such that: H · s = y j and (u I2B( j)) · G ⊕ e = c where s ∈ B(2p, ω) and e ∈ B(n,t).
Group Signature Scheme
In this paper, we are interested in the static group signature case. For that, we will follow the definitions presented in the BMW model (Bellare et al., 2003) . Definition 2.6. A group signature scheme GS is a tuple of four polynomial time algorithms (KeyGen, Sign,Veri f y, Open). The description of these algorithms is as follows:
1. KeyGen : this randomized algorithm takes as input (1 λ ; 1 N ), where N ∈ N is the number of group users, and outputs (gpk, gmsk, gsk), where gpk is the group public key, gmsk is the group manager's secret key and gsk = {gsk[ j]} j∈[0,N−1] with gsk[ j] being the secret key for the group user of index j.
2. Sign : it is a randomized algorithm, it takes as input a secret signing key gsk[ j] for some j ∈ [0, N − 1] and a message M and returns a group signature Σ on M.
3. Verify : it is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the group public key gpk, a message M, a signature Σ on M, and returns either 1 (Accept) or 0 (Reject).
4. Open : this deterministic algorithm takes as input the group manager's secret key gmsk, a message M, a signature Σ on M and returns an index j ∈ [0, N − 1] associated with a particular user, or False indicating failure.
A group signature scheme as described in BMW model (Bellare et al., 2003) must verify three security requirements:
• Correctness:
for all integers λ and N, all (gpk, gmsk, gsk) obtained from KeyGen algorithm with (1 λ ; 1 N ) as input, all j ∈ {0, .., N − 1} and M ∈ {0, 1} * Veri f y (gpk, M, Sign(gpk, gsk[ j] , M)) = 1 and Open (gpk, gmsk, M, Sign(gpk, gsk[ j] , M)) = j
• Traceability: requires that all signatures, even those produced by a coalition of group users and the group manager, can be traced back to a member of the coalition.
• Anonymity: requires that, signatures generated by two distinct group users are computationally indistinguishable to an adversary knowing all the user secret keys. Formal definitions of these properties are described in the following definitions: Definition 2.7 (CPA anonymity). We say that a group signature GS = (KeyGen, Sign,Veri f y, Open) is CPAanonymous if for all polynomial N(·) and any PPT adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in λ: 1. Run (gpk, gmsk, gsk) ← KeyGen(1 λ , 1 N ) and send A succeeds if (1) Veri f y(gpk, M * , Σ * ) = 1 and (2) Sign(gsk[ j], M * ) was never queried for j / ∈ CU, yet (3) Open(gmsk, M * , Σ * ) / ∈ CU.
OUR PROPOSED GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we present our improved group signature scheme of (Ezerman et al., 2015) . The improvement concern the KeyGen algorithm which is responsible to generate group public key gpk, group manager secret key gmsk and group secret key gsk. We aim to reduce the group signature public key's length, for that, we proceed in two steps: first we use a generator matrix G of QC-MDPC code, as described in (Misoczki et al., 2013) , to run the randomised QC-MDPC McEliece cryptosystem variant in order to have a reduced length of public key for the same security level achieved using Goppa codes. Second, we act at the choice of the matrix H used in the Zero Knowledge interactive protocol by using random double circulant matrix than a random one as presented in (Gaborit and Girault, 2007) . The algorithms Sign, Veri f y and Open remain unchanged.
Our scheme is as follows: KeyGen(1 λ , 1 N ) : takes as input a security parameter λ and the number of group users N = 2 . Outputs: the group public key gpk, group manager secret key gmsk and the group secret keys gsk. Then, we select: -Parameters: n = n(λ), q = q(λ), w = w(t) for the (n, q, w)-QC-MDPC code.
-Parameters: p = p(λ), ω = ω(λ) for the syndrome decoding problem. -A collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1} * → {1, 2, 3} k (where k = ω(log(λ))) used in the Fiat Schamir paradigm (Fiat and Shamir, 1987) .
Let G be the public key of QC-MDPC variant of McEliece cryptosystem, G ∈ F (n−q)×n 2 is the generator matrix of a (n, q, w) QC-MDPC code. As described in Remark 2.1, to generate the matrix G we need only (n − q) bits. Unlike the original scheme where G ∈ F (n−q)×n 2 (of length (n − q) × n) is a generator matrix of (n, k,t) Goppa code.
be a random double circulant matrix, where I p is the identity matrix and A is a p × p circulant matrix of length p . Therefore, we need only p bits (corresponding to the first row of A) to generate H which is not the case in the original scheme where H is chosen uniformly random. The KeyGen algorithm proceeds as follows: Theorem 3.1. The group signature scheme is correct, CPA anonymous, traceable and the public key has size of ((n − q) + (N + 1)p) bits.
A sketch of proof of this theorem is in Section 4.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our code-based group signature scheme satisfies all the security properties listed in Subsection 2.3.
It is clear that the size of the public key is ((n − q) + (N + 1)p) bits, since G and H have size of (n − q) bits and p bits respectively and for all j ∈ [0, N − 1] y j is of length p bits.
• Correctness Let j ∈ [0, N − 1] be a honest user. Consequently, there exists a tuple ( j, s, u, e) that satisfy Equation 3. Π is a valid signature thanks to the perfect completeness of the underlying Zero Knowledge Protocol, then the algorithm Verify(gpk, M, Σ) always outputs 1 for all M ∈ {0, 1} * . On the other hand, let c be a ciphertext of the form c = (u I2B( j)) · G ⊕ e. If we run the algorithm D(gmsk,c), the output will be I2B( j) by the correctness of the randomised QC-MDPC variant of McEliece. Finally, Veri f y and Open are correct which implies the correctness of the signature scheme.
• Anonymity Since we use a randomized version of QC-MDPC McEliece and given the hardness of DMcE(n, k,t) problem and the DLPN(q 1 , n, B(n,t)) probleme in the QC-MDPC case (Remark 2.2), the CPA anonymity proof will be the same as (Ezerman et al., 2015) .
• Traceability
We consider A a PPT adversary against the traceability of the scheme with success probability equal to ε. We construct a PPT adversary F that is able to solve a SD(2p, p, ω) problem with success probability polynomially related to ε. Algorithm F receives a challenge SD(2p, p.ω) in-
with H a random double circulant matrix.
The goal of F is to find a vector s ∈ B(2p, ω) such that Hs T = y T . It then proceeds as follows:
1. Pick a guess j * ∈ [0, N − 1] and set y j * = y. 2p, ω) and set y j ∈ F p 2 be its syndrome, i.e., y T j = Hs T j .
3. Run K (n, q, w,t) to obtain a key pair (pk ME = G ∈ F (n−q)×n 2 , sk ME ). 4. Sent gpk = (G, H, y 0 , ..., y N−1 ), gmsk = sk ME to A. The forger F then initializes a set CU = ∅ and handles the queries from A as follows:
-Queries to the random oracle H are handled by consistently returning uniformly random values
then F sets CU = CU ∪ j and gives s j to A; If j = j * , then F aborts.
-O Sign( j,M) , for any j ∈ [0, N − 1] and any message M : if j = j * , then F honestly computes a signature since it has s j ; If j = j * , then F returns a simulated signature Σ * .
The adversary A give a forged signature Σ * on a message M * . The requirements of the traceability experiment implies that: Veri f y(gpk, M * , Σ * ) = 1 and Open(gmsk, M * , Σ * ) = j * .
By applying the same technics used in the traceability proof (Ezerman et al., 2015) , F is able to solve the SD(2p, p, ω) with non negligible probability which contradicted the hardness of SD(2p, p, ω) problem.
RESULTS
In Table 1 , we compare our results with the original scheme one (Ezerman et al., 2015) for different size of group users and for 80 bits security level.
We use a (n, q, w,t) QC-MDPC code of parameters n = 9602, q = 4801, w = 90, t = 84 the size of the matrix G is n − q = 4801 bits (parameters for 80 bits security). It is shown in (Misoczki et al., 2013) that for this parameters the QC-MDPC McEliece cryptosystem is secure against the best attacks (Key distinguishing attack, Key recovery attack and Decoding attack).
We also use a double circulant matrix H of size p = 350 bits to achieve the same security level (80 bits) as it was detailed in (Gaborit and Girault, 2007) . We notice that our results, for the public key size, are better than ones obtained in the original scheme especially for groups with small size. For instance, when we have a group of N = 2 4 the size of our public key is 466 times shorter than the previous scheme. However when N ≥ 2 16 , the reduction factor tends to 1.57.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a provably secure code based group signature scheme with reduced public key length, the public keys can be 466 times shorter than the original scheme, typically for a group of 16 users when the public key is 1.34 kB, while the size is 625 kB in the original scheme. The proposed scheme also satisfies the correctness, CPA anonimity and traceability properties which are the security requirements for a static group signature scheme. In a future work, we will try to reduce the signature size. We can also construct a scheme achieving CCAanonymity and supporting revocation mechanism.
